Boko Haram remained a purely Nigerian issue for years, but that is changing fast. The group's aspirations, and its pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, are broadening the scope of the global jihadist threat.

That threat is one the United States cannot overlook - especially as Boko Haram destabilizes West and Central Africa, a region that remains a significant exporter of raw materials but also a hub for trafficking of all kinds.

The group, whose name is often translated as "Western education is forbidden," launched an insurgency in 2009 following violent clashes with Nigerian police forces. The conflict has since displaced and killed thousands of people and has ground northern Nigeria's economy to a halt.

Nigeria's own government grossly underestimated the threat posed by Boko Haram. The group has proven to be highly flexible, both in its ideology and in its use of tactics, and Boko Haram now reaches far beyond the confines of Nigeria. In the past 12 months, the group has perpetrated large-scale kidnappings that garnered it international notoriety; declared a caliphate spanning significant parts of the northeastern Nigerian states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe; and attacked urban centers in Cameroon and Niger. The group's use of children as suicide bombers and its scorched-earth attack on the remote city of Baga in January 2015, in which Amnesty International estimates 2,000 lives were lost, demonstrate Boko Haram's growing propensity for large-scale violence.

An overstretched region reacts

In reaction to Boko Haram's attacks on Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, the outlines of a more coherent regional response have emerged. No longer able to stand back and simply defend their borders, Nigeria's neighbors - with Chad in the lead - launched a ground and air offensive from Niger, effectively opening up another front in the fight against Boko Haram. Although Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon have registered some advances, their offensives have been reactive and uncoordinated - a mid-term, proactive strategy is needed. More important, while the armies of Chad and Niger are pushing forward, Cameroon is running low on funds for its operations, and Benin, the fifth regional partner in the push against Boko Haram, has yet to send any troops. Multilateral security efforts have been found wanting. The African Union sanctioned an 8,700-strong regional force to combat Boko Haram, but for now it exists only on paper.

This crisis will not be solved within the region, with only nominal support from the United States and France. Despite talk of regional mobilization and of cooperation between West and Central Africa's main regional organizations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), regional actors won't provide the necessary support to deal Boko Haram a permanent defeat. After political crises in Mali and the Central African Republic, and the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the region's militaries are overstretched. Furthermore, 2015 is a year of elections, which add a dose of uncertainty and instability at the national level.

West African countries, particularly those with significant Muslim populations, are deeply worried about the possible knock-on effects of Boko Haram. Yet recent conversations with officials in Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Cote d'Ivoire - key members of ECOWAS - did not point toward any imminent regional effort against Boko Haram, nor toward a significant allocation of resources to end the conflict.

Worries for Washington

The opportunistic nature of Boko Haram should also be cause for concern for the United States. In a bid to embed the group in global jihadist movements, Boko Haram recently pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, becoming the fourth group to do so in Africa, and the first south of the Sahara. Boko Haram has also taken on the symbols and messaging techniques of the Islamic State, translating its videos into English, French, and Arabic to reach a global audience. The international community needs to place a greater priority on stemming extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Efforts to build a coalition to fight the Islamic State need to be extended to Boko Haram. Engaging civilians largely marginalized in the fight against violent extremists will also be key in addressing the economic, social, and political dimensions of the conflict.

France has close to 9,000 troops on the continent, as well as eight permanent or temporary military bases in West and Central Africa, and it has intervened in Mali and the Central African Republic in the past two years. Regional actors cannot solely rely on French support. The United States will need to work with France and other international actors to provide the logistical support the region's forces require to fight Boko Haram. Washington and Paris could also do much more to push the Nigerian government to counter Boko Haram, to better protect civilians in the northern states, and to avoid further delays in the electoral process, which would only stoke further instability in Nigeria.

As defense budgets decrease in the United States and Europe, and as crises in other parts of the globe take precedence, it is perhaps no surprise that Boko Haram is a low priority in Western capitals. But the severity of the conflict now requires decisive political, military, and diplomatic action by regional and international actors, as well as a long-term plan for Nigeria to address the internal tensions at the core of the crisis.

Madeleine Goerg, is a program officer for The German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Sophie Dembinski is a program coordinator for The German Marshall Fund of the United States.