John Ngu Foncha is the political leader who led Southern Cameroons to “reunification” with Republic of Cameroun. He achieved the feat following his triumph in the general elections of 1959 over E.M.L. Endeley who was premier of Southern Cameroons. The elections were free and fair, to use the parlance of today, because at that time, only elections on a level playing field were imagined and imaginable!

The Foncha Syndrome is defined by many elements of naivety. Probably because it has had its most visible symbols from Bamenda – Foncha and Fru Ndi – it has come to earn the sobriquet, “My Bamenda.” The syndrome was generated by a misplaced confidence that derived from the openness of politics in Southern Cameroons that made Foncha’s defeat of Endeley possible. The confidence was reflected in a 1961 editorial of The Daily Times Newspaper of Victoria that stated: “We are bringing into this union a great inheritance, viz., Democracy; the English have … given us a democratic way of thinking…With this inheritance we need not be afraid to meet our brethren across the border for we are not coming empty handed…”

This confidence was compounded by a blind believe and trust in the goodness of their “brethren,” as described by Victor E. Mukete in his book, “My Odyssey.” To Ahidjo’s declaration that ‘We of French Cameroun are not annexationists….we are ready to discuss (unification) with them (of the British zone), but we will do so on a footing of equality…,” Mukete say, “We had no reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement….You may call me naïve because I do not seem to be taking account of power politics….”

This misplaced confidence and blind believe and trust are the hallmarks of the naivety that constitutes The Foncha Syndrome.

Power politics, inheritance, bringing and giving democracy may indeed be part of human interactions and aspiration. If the English gave them democracy, they could as well take it to their brethren. Democratic culture or democracy is the whole body of efforts made by a people to create its society, sustain it, and develop it; a collective acquisition; a collective achievement. When the Fonchas thought of bringing democracy to their brethren, they were probably serious, but they did not seem to understand the immensity of the task!

Those the colonialists placed in the saddle to play their power games for them at “independence,” especially people like Ahidjo to whom power was handed on a platter of gold, were first mentored and tutored by the colonial “masters” on what Robert Greene would call the 48 laws of power – the nature of power, the exercise of power; power games, power politics! They were schooled on the scheming duplicity and civilized warfare that define human power interactions in all societies, since human nature is virtually constant, and virtually the same for communities – of the “English zone” or of the “French zone.” In other word, before his “son” – his successor – became the pupil of the French, Ahidjo had already travelled the same route! And when his “son” talked of bringing democracy to us, it was an exercise in duplicity.

By the time Ahidjo got the “power” the colonialists wanted him to exercise for them, he knew the line of march as Karl Marx would put it, and never deviated from it. He had mastery over the ends and the means to achieve those ends. He used ambiguous, open ended political actions to lure those who were foolish enough to take him seriously, and crush them. Indeed, he knew about deception, seduction and manipulation – all potent weapons in the game of power.

Ahidjo’s line of march had two negative effects. First, the pupil could never outsmart the master in power games, so the country he became guide of, remained the subordinate of France figuratively and in essence. Second, those who were coming to “meet their brothers” were foolish enough to judge him by his intentions rather than by the effects of his actions; to believe in fine speeches which were only meant for their ears and their hearts. So they were crushed figuratively, and in essence. The result was a helpless people that have come to earn a most befitting sobriquet. If those with uneasy consciences like Bernard Fonlon that saw all of it coming were to come back today, they would have no doubt that we have not made it; we have marred!

In the neocolonial dispensation we have lived in for over 50 years, the person at the helm of the state is “approved” by neocolonial forces inside and outside the country. Any effort to remove him “democratically” or “undemocratically” will always meet with resistance from inside and outside the country. Change may be an uphill task, but the Presidential election of October 1992 showed that if you prepare the people for the task, everything is possible. Unfortunately, The Foncha Syndrome, again, stood in the way, so when the people were marching forward, those who had mobilized the people to vote for change were calling for “calm.” The Foncha Syndrome prevented them from heeding Napoleon’s famous aphorism that “if you want to take Vienna, take Vienna!” They trumped the people’s power with tentativeness and half measures, so neocolonial power settled down and continued to do what it has always done since “independence.”

“My Bamenda” is a byword in Cameroon that fires a series of instinctive and emotional images about naivety, goodness to the fault, the easily exploited, the easily manipulated, the foolish… No one knows who formulated it or who first used it, but no one doubts what it means. By learning about Machiavellian power politics in the neocolonial setting in which we live, one can be able to evaluate the “the plight of Anglophones” since 1961, and the plight of the struggle for democracy in Cameroon since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, when a cold breeze also blew through Cameroon. Indeed, one would be able to better appreciate the glaring duplicity of actors like Ahmadou Ahidjo in the general effort made by Cameroonians to create a “Nation” and keep the nation in existence. It will help shape the course of events in Cameroon today and tomorrow.