The recent people’s power in Burkina Faso that has at least in the interim saddled the military in power has once again brought to the fore the debate on the role of the military in African politics. The reasons for military interventions (militocracy) in Africa are as varied as they are complex.

They range from personal grievances of civilian regimes to the political and economic kleptocracy of civilian regimes. In a struggle to cope with this predicament between the devil of tyranny (as in one-party systems) and the deep blue sea of anarchy (as in multiparty systems) military rule has often been invoked.

My research interest is not to out rightly condemn military coups but to diagnose the merits and demerits of each intervention and asses them by their individual characters. In this vein, I have categorised military interventions in the following political shades against a historical background of their occurrence:

Soldiers as Power-Mongers The 1960 civilian leadership in Africa was basically pan-African to the extent that some failed to cover enough ground in their own national territories. This gave leeway to soldiers as power-mongers.

Among the prominent military take-overs in the 1960s were those in Congo (Kinshasa) in November 1965 by Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu, and in the same year in Algeria by Colonel Houari Boummedienne; in Nigeria in January 1966 by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, followed later by a counter-coup by Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi; a month later in Ghana by Colonel Akwasi Amankwaah Afrifa; in Togo in January 1967 by Lieutenant Colonel Etienne Gnassingbe Eyadema; in Mali in 1968 by Lieutenant Moussa Traore; and in Libya in September 1969 by Colonel Muammar Kaddafi.

The symbol of benign militocracy in this epoch is Muammar Kaddafi. He, with a small group of unknown young officers, overthrew the monarchy of king Idris (I) to establish a participatory democracy based on people’s congresses and committees. Kaddafi succeeded in wresting power from the former colonialists by exploiting Libyan wealth and putting it at the disposal of the citizens. He was assassinated by Imperialist forces on October 20, 2011

Soldiers as power-Brokers The 1970-1980 civilian leadership in Africa was basically nationalist to the extent that it wanted to have a tyrannical grip on every facet of national life. Torn between the exigencies of “under the tree” rule and the pressure of Cold War politics, the leadership opened avenues for soldiers to step in as power-brokers.

Prominent among the military coups in the 1970s were the experiences in Uganda in 1971 by Idi Amin Dada; in Ethiopia in 1974 by Colonial Mengistu Haile Mariam, in Nigeria in July 1975 by General Muhammad Murtala; and in Ghana in 1979 by Flight-Lieutenant John Jerry Rawlings. The most benign of these take-overs was that of Muhammad Murtala. General Murtala’s eight-month Government gained a reputation for integrity and commitment to radical change and was welcomed by most Nigerians.

In the 1980s, there were take-overs in Liberia in April 1980 by Master-Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe; in Ghana in 1981 once again by Rawlings; in Nigeria in 1983 by Major-General Muhamadu Buhari; and in 1986 by General Ibrahim Badamasi Babaginda; in Burkina Faso in 1983 by Captain Thomas Sankara; in Guinea in 1984 by Colonel Lansana Conte; and in 1986 in Uganda by Yoweri Museveni.

The most spectacular of military rules in the 1980s was that of Captain Thomas Sankara. He instituted a nation in which all citizens participated in its development and brought the masses into political and economic decision-making. He lasted in power for only four years.

Soldiers as power sharers In spite of some of the positive records of some military rule, it has been observed that the military should stick to their legitimate places in the barracks. They should return to their roles as protectors of state security, not as custodians of political power.

The people of Africa saw the one-party tyranny as a front for militocracy, and the only way the military could be excluded was through the national constitutional reforms. The 1990s were therefore years of national debate. That debate was to provide Africa with a democratic system which will enable it to aspire to a stable political and economic future. Unfortunately, most African leaders refused to budge and where they did, it was for political convenience rather than conviction, and so the military rode on.

The 1990-2000 civilian leadership in Africa is basically globalist, to the extent that it has yielded its power to international donors.

The masses have watched how their independent gains have been pillaged by the ‘axis of economic evil’ (the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organisation); they have watched with pain their republican institutions turned into burdens of monarchy; they have watched in distress how their humble leaders have transformed themselves into demi-gods.

The social democracy that the masses were advocating has become so neo-liberal that the only (dis)credit one can give multipartyism is having expanded both the economic and political space for simpering elite (across the political divide). These simpering elite thrive on election manipulation, social exclusion and brazen corruption. If the masses were helpless, the soldiers thought they still could make contribution to national life.

Prominent among the military coups in the 1990s were Mali’s 1991 coup by Ahmadou Toumani Toure; Nigeria’s 1993 coup by General Sani Abacha; the 1997 coup in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) by Laurent Desire Kabila; and Sierra Leone’s series of coups embodied by the late Foday Sankoh. The most benign of these was Ahmadou Toumani Toure who took power, installed a national conference, and the following year left the scene for civilian rule. That he came back in 2001 as elected leader is proof of his charisma and popularity.

Soldiers as statesmen Africa has tried both the single party (where there was discipline without democracy) and multiparty system (where there is liberalization without discipline) but the military seldom remained in the barracks. National debates were deferred until the late 1990s. In 1999, Khadafi-who thought the gains African countries had made during independence had all been lost back to the colonialists – called for a continental debate in Sirte. One of the main things that came out of the Sirte debate was the transformation of the Organization of African Unity, OAU, into the African Union, AU.

Among the 33 articles that were adopted in the AU Treaty was Article 30: “Government which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union.” Was the word ‘unconstitutional’ to mean just coming to power by the bullet?

In spite of this resolution, the wave of military coups continues, even in twenty-first century Africa. From the Central Africa Republic, through Egypt, Tunisia, Mali to Guinea.

From the utterances of coup leaders, there seems to be a return to benign military. The coup leaders always establish a short-term transition during which there is a national debate, national catharsis and national reconciliation.

Strangely, most of the coup leaders enjoy maximum co-operation not only from their citizens but recognition and support as well from regional bodies in the continent. The Central African organ, CEMAC, gave Bozize a red-carpet treatment after he ousted elected leader Ange Patasse, who sought political asylum first in Cameroon and then in Togo.

The West African organ, ECOWAS, yielded to rebel pressure and presided over the departure of democratically elected Charles Taylor from Liberia. ECOWAS also negotiated the smooth resignation from power by Kumba Yaya in Guinea-Bissau to make way for a rebel-led agenda.

In the 1960s, coups were quickly and decisively condemned, but what is happening today that young Turks are given more prominence than opposition leaders? Should we not now agree with African revisionist scholars that Africa’s real political and development problem lies in copying the wrong borrowed Western models?

Militocracy, whether benign or malign, has no legal binding, it is not the people’s best choice, but as long as democratic avenues are gagged by truncated elections and constitutional panel-beating and as long as civilian leadership in Africa thrives by grotesque routine instead of by grandiose reform, the military will remain the people’s hidden choice.

Militocracy, whether benign or malign, is a dangerous trend, but as long as the weak civil society is pauperized and emasculated by civilian (mis)rule, they will be tempted to yield their voices to benign militocracy in the hope that the bloodless bullet will silence the fraudulent ballot and bring to national debate, the unanswered questions of what independence, democracy, citizenship, justice and economic empowerment mean to the people of Africa.